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A CHOICE OF RULES IN TITLE VII
RETALIATION CLAIMS FOR NEGATIVE
EMPLOYER REFERENCES
SARAH CARRINGTON WALKER BAKER
INTRODUCTION
Terrie Hillig worked at the Defense Finance Accounting Service
(DFAS) for five years, during which time she filed two Title VII
racial discrimination complaints.1 The complaints were settled under
terms that required DFAS to “upgrade [her] performance appraisal,
expunge negative information from her personnel file, and
retroactively promote her.”2 After the settlement, Hillig applied for a
position at the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and was told by her
interviewer that she would be “a perfect fit for the position.”3 Despite
this praise, Hillig did not receive the job. After she was rejected,
Hillig discovered that one of her supervisors gave “very strong
negative feedback” to the DOJ and that this information may have
disqualified her for the job.4 Hillig’s supervisor “admitted
characterizing Hillig as a ‘shitty employee’ . . . .”5 After being rejected
for the DOJ position, Hillig filed suit for retaliation.6
Negative references are something employers are increasingly
nervous about because of uncertainty as to what liability exposure
they incur when giving a reference.7 One human resources expert
Copyright © 2005 by Sarah Carrington Walker Bake r.
1. Hillig v. Rumsfeld, 381 F.3d 1028, 1029 (10th Cir. 2004).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1030 (internal quotation marks omitted).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Some employers will not give references at all for fear of liability; according to a survey
by the Society for Human Resource Management, one in five employers refuses to do so.
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explains that “[t]he ‘silence is golden’ approach to providing
references has definitely triumphed over an ‘available on request’
philosophy. Why? Because litigation anxiety is alive and well in the
reference checking arena.”8 Getting references is increasingly
desirable, both because employers wish to hire the best possible
employees and because they are attuned to potential security risks;
failing to get adequate references exposes employers to the possibility
of lawsuits for negligent hiring.9 Yet employers’ desire to get accurate
references clashes with a countervailing trend: a swift increase in the
number of retaliation claims against employers for negative
references.10 Retaliation cases over negative references involve claims
that the negative reference was motivated by a desire to “get back” at
the employee for engaging in protected activity under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).11 A negative reference, although
perhaps less dramatic than termination, can be just as devastating to
an employee’s career in that it extends beyond the current
employment relationship to taint a potential future one.
Both the importance of the reference issue to employers and the
potentially devastating consequences of negative references for
employees resonate in the Tenth Circuit’s recent opinion of Hillig v.
Rumsfeld.12 In Hillig, as in other Title VII retaliation and
discrimination cases, the court applied the McDonnell Douglas
framework13 for burden shifting which, as a threshold matter, requires
that the employee prove a prima facie case of retaliation.14 To

Carolyn Hirschman, The Whole Truth, HR MAGAZINE, June 2000, at 86, 86–87. For a
thoughtful discussion of the ethical and legal implications of reference giving, see Ellen
Harshman & Denise R. Chachere, Employee References: Between the Legal Devil and the
Ethical Deep Blue Sea, 23 J. BUS. ETHICS 29, 34–38 (2000).
8. WENDY BLISS, LEGAL , EFFECTIVE R EFERENCES: HOW TO GIVE AND GET THEM 7
(2001).
9. Id. at 22–24; see also Mark J. Dorris & Brian H. Kleiner, New Developments
Concerning Negligent Hiring in Public Schools, MGMT. R ES. N EWS, Feb. 2003, at 155, 159
(analyzing how to prevent liability by checking references before hiring). In addition to avoiding
litigation, reference checking assures an employer that the applicant is who he says he is:
“[A]bout 30 percent of all job applicants make material misrepresentations on resumes . . . .”
Pamela Babcock, Spotting Lies, HR MAGAZINE, Oct. 2003, at 46, 47.
10. See Robin E. Shea, Break the Retaliation Cycle, HR MAGAZINE, July 2002, at 89, 89
(“More than 27 percent of all charges filed with the EEOC in 2001 were retaliation charges.”).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000).
12. 381 F.3d 1028 (10th Cir. 2004).
13. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Greene, 411 U.S. 792, 800–07 (1973) (identifying the
system of burden shifting for Title VII disparate treatment claims).
14. Id. at 1030–31.
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establish a prima facie case, the employee must show that the
employer has taken an “adverse employment action” against her.15
Although such employer actions as terminations and demotions fall
clearly into this category, the requirement is defined differently
among the circuits, and some types of employer action, including
negative references, have proven very difficult to categorize.16 In
Hillig, the Tenth Circuit found that a negative reference constituted
an adverse employment action even though there was no proof that
the employee would have received the job if the reference had not
been given. 17 This holding sparked debate both within the media and
among academics about whether the Tenth Circuit’s standard for
defining an adverse employment action exposes employers to
unnecessary liability.18
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Hillig aroused controversy not
only because it seemed to leave employers too vulnerable to
retaliation suits, but also because it highlighted the divide among the
circuits as to what exactly constitutes an adverse employment action
in Title VII retaliation claims. The circuits disagree as to whether an
employee must show she would have received the prospective job but
for the negative reference.19 They gene rally follow either the
“narrow” or “broad” rules for determining what constitutes an
adverse action.20 Circuits that apply the “narrow” or “conservative”
standard require that an employee who receives a negative reference
prove that she would have gotten the prospective job if not for that
reference, whereas circuits applying the “broad” or “liberal” standard
apply a more holistic test and do not require such “but for”
evidence.21

15. See infra Part I.A for a detailed explanation of the prima facie case and McDonnell
Douglas framework.
16. See Matthew J. Wiles, Comment, Defining Adverse Employment Action in Title VII
Claims for Employer Retaliation: Determining the Most Appropriate Standard, 27 U. DAYTON L.
R EV. 217, 223–241 (2001) (discussing the difficulty of categorizing certain employment actions
and the standards that should be used to do so).
17. Hillig, 381 F.3d at 1031–33.
18. See Maria Greco Danaher, Negative References Can Be ‘Adverse Action,’ HR
MAGAZINE, Nov. 2004, at 131, 131 (discussing Hillig v. Rumsfeld); Patrick F. Dorrian, Negative
Reference Proved Retaliation Claim of Defense Employee, Tenth Circuit Rules, LEADING THE
N EWS, THE BUREAU OF N ATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., Sept. 2, 2004, AA-1 (same).
19. See infra Part II.
20. See id.
21. See infra Part II.A. Some scholars have divided the circuits into three camps: narrow,
intermediate, and broad. See Melissa A. Essary & Terence D. Friedman, Retaliation Claims
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Although there has been thoughtful discussion about how the
adverse employment action requirement should generally be defined,
neither the Supreme Court nor scholars have addressed the more
specific issue of employer liability in retaliation claims for providing a
negative reference.22 Although other types of employer actions have
also proved difficult to classify consistently in adverse employment
action determinations, this Note refrains from analyzing these other
actions in favor of closely examining the important issue of employer
references.23 References are a particularly important issue for both
employers and employees in this increasingly security-conscious
world; in addition to traditional concerns over hiring competent
people, employers now worry about the safety of employees and
customers.24 Despite the acute need for employer references that go
beyond the “name, rank, and serial number” approach taken by so
many employers,25 the current confusion in the law has created an
environment in which employers are more reluctant than ever to
provide references for fear of litigation. Not only are references an
issue of great import for employers, but as allegations in negative
reference retaliation cases range from the most frivolous26 to the very
Under Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA: Untouchable Employees, Uncertain Employers,
Unresolved Courts, 63 MO. L. R EV. 115, 134–40 (1998). Professors Essary and Friedman identify
the Second and Third Circuits as falling into the intermediate camp, but this Note will show
that, using references as a point of analysis, the Second Circuit follows the narrow rule and the
Third Circuit follows the broad rule. See id.; infra Part II. This Note argues that the First, Third,
Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits all follow the broad rule. See infra note 69. The Second and
Eleventh Circuits follow the narrow rule. See infra note 61; see also Wendy Hyland, Note, Equal
Opportunity for Employers: Elevating the Adverse Employment Action Standard to Allow Only
Meritorious Retaliation Claims, 90 K Y. L.J. 273, 277–83 (2001) (dividing the circuits into liberal,
moderate, and conservative groups).
22. The Supreme Court case of Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. held that the term “employee” as
used in Title VII includes former employees, and thus that retaliation and discrimination suits
may be brought by former employees. 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997). The Court, however, did not go
beyond this holding to address the retaliation issue specifically. Id. For an analysis of the impact
of Shell Oil, see Lucia B. Thompson, Annual Survey of Labor and Employment Law, 39 B.C. L.
R EV. 410, 410–21 (1998).
23. Some examples of these other difficult-to-classify potential adverse actions are verbal
threats of termination, missed pay increases, and reprimands. Wiles, supra note 16, at 223–29.
24. See BLISS, supra note 8, at 23 (describing an incident where, after Allstate Insurance
Company failed to mention concerns about a mentally unstable employee in a recommendation
to his new employer, Fire man's Fund Insurance Co., the employee killed several employees and
himself when Fireman's Fund fired him for an unexcused absence).
25. Id. at 3–7.
26. See, e.g., Brown v. Chicago Transit Auth., 115 Fed. App’x 865, 867 (7th Cir. 2004)
(finding that the employee failed to produce evidence that her previous employer was even
contacted by any prospective employers, much less that it gave her a negative reference).
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serious,27 these cases offer a unique opportunity to consider the
appropriateness of the broad and narrow rules in general. An analysis
of negative reference cases, as discussed in Part III, illustrates the
great danger that the narrow rule poses to employees’ ability to assert
their rights under Title VII.
This Note agrees with other scholars that the narrow rule
inappropriately applies Supreme Court precedent. Unlike previous
scholarship, however, it also argues that the narrow rule introduces an
additional and incorrect “but for” causation requirement into the
prima facie case. This Note addresses for the first time the recent
Supreme Court case of Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, which
considered the parameters of the tangible employment action
requirement in discrimination cases,28 and its likely impact on this
debate. Further, the uniform adoption of the broad rule is necessary
to balance the relevant public policy interests such as deterring
retaliation, promoting responsible recordkeeping by employers,
information forcing, ensuring that Title VII’s protections remain vital,
and discouraging friv olous retaliation suits. Finally, this Note argues
that when the broad rule is analyzed within the context of the entire
McDonnell Douglas framework, the result is a balanced test that
takes both employer and employee interests into consideration;
therefore, the Supreme Court should grant certiorari in a future Title
VII retaliation case and determine that the broad rule is the correct
standard for judging adverse employment actions.
Part I briefly outlines the requirements for making a prima facie
retaliation case and reviews Supreme Court precedent influencing
retaliation cases. Part II uses the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Hillig as a
lens through which to examine the current split in the circuits as to
the meaning of an adverse employment action. Part III uses the issue
of negative references to show the particular dangers of the narrow
rule and both the policy and legal advantages of the broad rule in
retaliation cases generally. Finally, Part IV addresses the practical
implications of the broad rule when viewed within the entirety of the
McDonnell Douglas framework.

27. See, e.g., Hillig v. Rumsfeld, 381 F.3d 1028, 1030 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[The employee’s
supervisor] also admitted characterizing Hillig as a ‘shitty employee.’”).
28. 542 U.S. 129 (2004).
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I. THE PRIMA FACIE CASE AND SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
An employee making a Title VII retaliation claim must first
prove a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas framework.
Although there is little Supreme Court precedent on retaliation
claims specifically, the Court’s standard for a tangible employment
action29 in the context of discrimination claims has been applied—
improperly—to retaliation claims as part of the narrow rule. The facts
of Hillig v. Rumsfeld can be applied to this framework to illustrate the
burden placed upon employees in making such a case.
A. McDonnell Douglas and the Prima Facie Case
Like many other federal statutes that regulate the employeremployee relationship, 30 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
relies on an antiretaliation provision to give effect to its prohibition of
discrimination in the workplace.31 Section 704 of Title VII establishes
that it is unlawful for an employer to:
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for
employment . . . because [the employee] has opposed any practice
made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or
because [the employee] has made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under this subchapter. 32

Without such a provision protecting employees who bring claims
against their employers, the threat of retaliation could chill potential
claims and undermine the effectiveness of Title VII.
As Title VII does not specify which party bears the burden of
proof in a retaliation case, courts follow the allocation of burdens
outlined by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

29. See infra Part I.C for a discussion of the distinction between the tangible and adverse
employment action standards.
30. See Donna Smith Cude & Brian M. Steger, Does Justice Need Glasses? Unla wful
Retaliation Under Title VII Following Mattern: Will Courts Know It When They See It? , 14 LAB.
LAW. 373, 375 n.10 (1998) (identifying several such statutes, including the Family and Medical
Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2615; the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4); the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3); and the Occupational Safety and Health
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)); see also Sarno v. Douglas Elliman-Gibbbons & Ives, Inc., 183 F.3d 155,
159 (2d Cir. 1999) (“It is appropriate to apply the framework used in analyzing retaliation claims
under Title VII in analyzing a claim of retaliation under the ADA.”).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000) [hereinafter “Title VII” ].
32. Id..
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Green.33 Even though the Supreme Court created the McDonnell
Douglas framework for the discrimination context, lower courts have
adapted and applied it to retaliation cases as well.34 Although the
Court has not clearly articulated all of the reasoning behind the
McDonnell Douglas framework, some members of the legal
community claim that it exists to provide “a significant helping hand
[to employees], to make sure their prospects are better than they
would be under the rigors of the ordinary rules of litigation.”35 This
Note (and much of the retaliation litigation) focuses on the first
burden in the framework, the employee’s establishment of a prima
facie case of retaliation.36 The prima facie case has three elements:
first, that the employee engaged in activity protected by Title VII;
second, that there is a causal connection between the adverse
employment action and the protected activity; and third, that the
employee suffered an adverse employment action.37 If the employee
successfully makes out a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to
the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
the adverse employment action.38 If the employer succeeds, the
employee, to maintain a claim, must establish that the employer’s
reason was merely a pretext.39
The facts of Hillig v. Rumsfeld can be used to clarify the
requirements for the prima facie case. Although the Tenth Circuit
only addressed the adverse employment action requirement in Hillig,
the next Section will apply each of the requirements to the facts of the
case to illustrate how an employee might establish a prima facie case
of retaliation.

33. See 411 U.S. 792, 800–07 (1973) (identifying the system of burden shifting for Title VII
disparate treatment claims); see also Cude & Steger, supra note 30, at 375–85 (offering an
analysis of the history of the framework).
34. See Cude & Steger, supra note 30, at 375 n.16 (listing cases in which the First, Seventh,
and Eighth Circuits have applied the McDonnell Douglas framework to retaliation cases).
35. Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L.
R EV. 2229, 2231 (1995).
36. See id. at 2276 n.153.
37. EEOC v. L.B. Foster Co., 123 F.3d 746, 754 (3d Cir. 1997).
38. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
39. Id. at 804.
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B. The Prima Facie Case as Applied to the Facts of
Hillig v. Rumsfeld
To make out a prima facie case, employees must show, first, that
they were involved with protected activity as it is defined in Title VII.
Hillig satisfied this requirement because she had filed the sexual
discrimination suit.40 Lesser involvement than filing suit will suffice as
well, as the statute defines “protected activity” broadly and includes
actions such as testifying against employers or simply opposing
unlawful employment practices.41 This is usually one of the more
clear-cut requirements.42
Second, employees must establish a causal link between the
alleged retaliation and their involvement with the protected activity.
Proving causation can be difficult, given that the employer must have
been aware of the protected activity and that there must be a close
temporal connection between the protected activity and the adverse
action in question.43 This element is fairly contentious, and the exact
definition of causation varies among federal courts.44 Although the
Hillig opinion did not address causation, Hillig would likely satisfy
this requirement, given that there was a close temporal connection
between her filing and settling of the discrimination suit and the
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000) (enumerating approved types of participation,
including having “made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII]”).
41. See id. Title VII specifies two different categories of protected activity, commonly
referred to as “participation” and “opposition.” Cude & Steger, supra note 30, at 378. The
opposition category has been more difficult for courts to define and varies by circuit. Id. at 379.
42. See Cude & Steger, supra note 30, at 378 (“Section 704(a)’s participation clause is
relatively straightforward.”).
43. See id. at 379–80:
The courts are in agreement that proof of retaliation may be shown by either direct or
circumstantial evidence. Likewise, the courts agree that, to demonstrate a causal link,
a employee must show that the person who took the allegedly adverse action was
aware that the employee had engaged in protected activity.
The Supreme Court has also declined to weigh in on the issue of causation, only briefly
discussing the issue in Clark County School District v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 272–74 (2001).
There, the employee failed to show that a reasonable person would have believed that the
actions against her were discriminatory and so did not make out a successful retaliation case. Id.
Without deciding the appropriate extent of causation in Title VII retaliation claims, the Court
considered the temporal proximity requirement and implied that it would allow a showing of
close temporal proximity to imply causation if it believed that the original activity was
protected. See id. at 273–74 (citing cases that require “very close” temporal proximity).
44. See Cude & Steger, supra note 30, at 380 n. 37 (“Due to [uncertainty over the issue of
temporal proximity], whether or not a plaintiff can establish a causal connection is often the
most hotly contested element of a retaliation lawsuit.”).
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negative reference she received when applying for the DOJ position.
Moreover, the supervisor who gave the negative reference knew
about her discrimination claims.45
Third, employees must show that the employer took an adverse
employment action against them. This is perhaps the most
contentious prong of the prima facie case because the law is unsettled.
The Supreme Court has clearly established, however, that the prima
facie case is intended to be a fairly low bar, so the adverse action
requirement should not be so tough as to screen out legitimate
cases.46 The outcome of Hillig ’s case depends on how the adverse
action requirement is defined. Part II offers a detailed examination of
how her fate would change under the different characterizations of
the adverse employment action requirement.
C. The Tangible Employment Action
In the absence of a Supreme Court decision clarifying the
requirements for the prima facie case for retaliation, lower courts
have looked to the Court’s seminal discrimination cases of Burlington
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth47 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton48 for
guidance.49 The cases dealt with employer liability for discriminatory
acts of supervisors under Title VII and held that employers would be
strictly liable when a supervisor “takes a tangible employment action
against [a] subordinate.”50 The Court famously defined tangible
employment action as “a significant change in employment status,
such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with
significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a
significant change in benefits.”51 If the employment action fails to
meet this high standard, the employer may raise an affirmative
45. Hillig would have had a more difficult time meeting the temporal proximity
requirement, see supra note 43, but it is unclear whether such temporal proximity is required in
every case.
46. See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (“The burden of
establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous.”).
47. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
48. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
49. See Rosalie Berger Levinson, Parsing the Meaning of “Adverse Employment Action” in
Title VII Disparate Treatment, Sexual Harassment, and Retaliation Claims: What Should Be
Actionable Wrongdoing?, 56 OKLA . L. R EV. 623, 635 n.24 (citing Evans v. City of Houston, 246
F.3d 344, 353 (5th Cir. 2001), and Boone v. Goldin, 178 F.3d 253, 255–56 (4th Cir. 1999), as
examples of cases incorrectly applying Ellerth to retaliation claims).
50. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760.
51. Id. at 761.
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defense to liability in the discrimination suit context.52 Although all of
the circuits follow these cases in the discrimination context,53 some
courts have inappropriately applied the Ellerth/Faragher definition of
tangible employment action to the adverse employment action
requirement in retaliation cases.54
The distinction between a tangible employment action and an
adverse employment action may seem merely semantic, but the level
of employer action required to establish the two types of actions has
been construed differently by the courts. The Supreme Court clarified
Ellerth/Faragher most recently in Pennsylvania State Police v.
Suders,55 explaining that the tang ible employment action requirement
applies in cases in which the employer will be strictly liable for the
discrimination; in situations in which there is no tangible employment
action, the employer may raise an affirmative defense to the claim.56
Specifically at issue in Suders was whether constructive discharge is a
tangible employment action under Title VII.57 The Court held that
whether a constructive discharge was a tangible employment action
would depend on the circumstance of the individual case; this “caseby-case”58 rule is likely to confuse the circuits even further as they
attempt to analogize the Suders holding to retaliation cases. Because
the Supreme Court has not defined what constitutes an adverse
employment action for the prima facie case of retaliation, the lower
courts have constructed their own, often conflicting, definitions.59

52. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
53. See Hillig v. Rumsfeld, 381 F.3d 1028, 1031 (10th Cir. 2004) (distinguishing the tangible
employment action standard from the adverse employment action standard used in retaliation
cases).
54. See Margery Corbin Eddy, Finding the Appropriate Standard for Employer Liability in
Title VII Retaliation Cases: An Examination of the Applicability of Sexual Harassment
Paradigms, 63 ALB. L. R EV. 361, 372–77 (1999) (explaining the historical application of sexual
harassment law to retaliation cases); see also infra Part III for a discussion of why this
application of the tangible employment action standard is incorrect.
55. 124 S. Ct. 2342 (2004).
56. Id. at 2347.
57. Id. at 2346–47.
58. Id. at 2357.
59. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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II. THE DIVISION IN THE CIRCUITS : NARROW VERSUS BROAD
Hillig v. Rumsfeld60 illustrates particularly well the problem of
defining an adverse employment action in the context of references.
Using this case as a framework, this Part analyzes the differences
between the narrow and broad views of what constitutes an adverse
employment action, as well as the Supreme Court precedent that
influences these rules. The narrow rule requires a prospective
employee to prove that she would have gotten the job if not for the
negative reference, whereas the broad rule applies a case-by-case
approach that requires the employee to prove only that the action
was “materially adverse” to the employee’s job status.
A. The Narrow Rule
The narrow rule, in the reference context, requires that the
employee show she would have received the prospective job were it
not for the negative reference, or put differently, that the negative
reference was an action that had an “ultimate” or “tangible ” effect on
the employee’s status. This rule provides an understandably welcome
bright-line for employers, and versions of this rule have been
followed by the Fifth, Second, and Eleventh Circuits.61 The Fifth
Circuit requires an employee to show that the employer took an
“ultimate employment action” against the employee in order to
satisfy the prima facie case standard; therefore a negative reference
will only be an ultimate employment action when it has the effect of
preventing the employee from getting a job she would have otherwise
received. 62 Actions such as “hiring, granting leave, discharging,
promoting, and compensating” are also ultimate employment actions,
and these actions would also be considered tangible employment
actions under the Supreme Court’s standard.63
Most of the circuits following the narrow rule refer to a tangible,
rather than ultimate, employment action, but the effect is the same:

60. Hillig v. Rumsfeld, 381 F.3d 1028 (10th Cir. 2004).
61. See Sarno v. Douglas Elliman-Gibbbons & Ives, Inc., 183 F.3d 155, 159 (2d Cir. 1999)
(requiring proof that the reference “caused or contributed to the reject by the prospective
employer”); Bailey v. USX Corp., 850 F.2d 1506, 1508 (11 th Cir. 1988) (finding that negative
reference was insufficient to show retaliation as the record indicated the employee would not
have been hired even if the reference had not been given).
62. See Mattern, 104 F.3d at 708 (following the rule “that Title VII’s anti-retaliation
provision refers to ultimate employment decisions”).
63. Id. at 707.
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the employee has a more difficult burden in establishing the prima
facie case than in a circuit following the broad rule.64 Hillig’s claim
would not have succeeded in circuits following this rule, as despite the
evidence of her supervisor’s egregious conduct, she could not show
definitively that she would have received the DFAS position were it
not for the reference. If DFAS moved for summary judgment, it
would have succeeded without having to offer any explanation for the
supervisor’s egregious conduct.
B. The Broad Rule
The Tenth Circuit found that Hillig did not have to prove that
she would have gotten the position but for the negative reference:
evidence that the negative reference was given, in light of the facts of
the case, was enough to satisfy the adverse action requirement.65
Rather than require a tangible employment action, circuits applying
the broad rule allow an employee to satisfy the adverse employment
action requirement if there is evidence that a negative reference was
given and the overall facts of the case support a finding that the
“employer’s conduct [was] materially adverse to the employee’s job
status.”66 According to the Tenth Circuit, a “mere inconvenience”67 or
de minimis injury will not suffice, and the facts of each case must be
considered in light of such factors as whether the action “causes
‘harm to future employment prospects.’”68 The Tenth Circuit is not
alone in this interpretation: the First, Third, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C.
Circuits all follow a version of this rule.69

64. Levinson, supra note 49, at 648.
65. Id. at 1031–35.
66. Id. at 1033 (quoting Wells v. Colo. Dept. of Transp., 325 F.3d 1205, 1213 (10th Cir.
2003).
67. Id. at 1031 (quoting Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 986–87 (10th Cir. 1996)).
68. Id. This test has been characterized as the broad rule by some scholars and has been
called a “case-by-case” approach by others. Essary & Friedman, supra note 21, at 139.
69. EEOC v. L.B. Foster Co., 123 F.3d 746, 754 (3d Cir. 1997); Brown v. Chi. Transit Auth.,
115 Fed. App’x 865, 867 (7th Cir. 2004); Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 675 (9th Cir. 1997);
Smith v. Sec’y of the Navy, 659 F.2d 1113, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also Hyland, supra note 21,
at 278–89 (explaining the First Circuit’s version of this rule). Professors Cude and Steger,
however, argue that most of the circuits follow the narrow rule as elucidated in Mattern v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 1997). Cude & Steger, supra note 30, at 382–83.
While the Fifth, Second, and Eleventh Circuits do follow the narrow rule, the professor’s claim
that the Seventh and Third Circuits follow the rule is incorrect. Although these Circuits have
struggled with formulating a clear rule, the standard applied is most similar to the broad rule, as
explained above.
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For example, in EEOC v. L.B. Foster Co.,70 the Third Circuit
found the employee had shown an adverse employment action in her
former employer’s refusal to give a reference, even though there was
no direct evidence that the refusal caused her rejection from the new
position to which she had applied.71 The court found that to hold
otherwise would be to excuse retaliation merely because it was not
effective: “[a]n employer who retaliates can not [sic] escape liability
merely because the retaliation falls short of its intended result.”72 This
statement encapsulates well the spirit of the broad rule.73
Although the broad rule is somewhat more employee-friendly
than the narrow rule, it is not an open invitation for frivolous lawsuits.
Even the Tenth Circuit, which describes its interpretation of adverse
employment actions as a “liberal definition,” has granted summary
judgment to many employers when employees have failed to meet the
requirements of the prima facie case.74 The resulting test, although
liberal in defining an adverse employment action, still ensures that
the prima facie case requirement performs its intended function of
weeding out those cases that are clearly without merit. It is
unfortunate that the Tenth Circuit’s language that it will “liberally
define[] the phrase adverse employment action”75 has been taken out
of context and incorrectly interpreted by critics to mean that it will
allow nearly any action to qualify.76
70. 123 F.3d 746 (3d Cir. 1997).
71. Id. at 754.
72. Id.
73. A few scholars have characterized the Third Circuit’s rule as a third type, calling it the
moderate rule. See Hyland, supra note 21, at 277–83 (characterizing the circuits as liberal,
intermediate, and conservative). When L.B. Foster Co. and Hillig are compared, however, it is
clear that the Third and Tenth Circuits both follow the broad rule. See L.B. Foster Co., 123 F.3d
at 754 (holding that excusing retaliation merely because it did not cause the employee to lose
the job would go against the purpose of the statute); Hillig , 381 F.3d at 1033 (“[W]hile we
require that the ‘e mployer’s conduct [] be materially adverse to the employee’s job status,’ we
allow an employee to show materiality other than by showing a tangible employment action.”
(quoting Wells v. Colo. Dep’t of Transp., 325 F.3d 1205, 1213 (10th Cir. 2003)) (internal citation
omitted) (alteration in original)). Those same scholars claim that the Se cond Circuit also follows
this “moderate” rule, but Sarno v. Douglas Elliman-Gibbons & Ives, Inc., 183 F.3d 155 (2d Cir.
1999), illustrates that the Second Circuit actually follows the narrow rule; see id. at 160,
requiring proof that the reference “caused or contributed to the rejection by the prospective
employer.”
74. Hillig, 381 F.3d at 1032.
75. Id. (quoting Sanchez v. Denver Pub. Sch., 164 F.3d 527, 532 (10th Cir. 1998) (alteration
in original)).
76. See Hyland, supra note 21, at 292 (arguing that the broad rule allows employees to
bring retaliation suits based on trivial employment actions).
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III. ARGUMENTS FOR A BROAD RULE IN THE CONTEXT OF
REFERENCES
The broad rule for defining an adverse employment action is the
best choice from both a legal and a policy standpoint. Legally, the
narrow rule fails in two major ways: first, it unnecessarily introduces
an additional “but for” causation element into the prima facie case
framework; and second, it improperly applies Supreme Court rulings
on discrimination, resulting in an unfairly restrictive rule. The Court’s
decision in Suders is likely to complicate this debate. The policy
arguments in favor of the broad rule are varied and compelling,
including promoting a level field of power and information between
the parties, protecting the validity of the original statute, and
deterrence.
A. Legal Arguments
This Note makes three legal arguments against the narrow rule.
First, the narrow rule inserts an additional “but for” causation
requirement into the prima facie case that is both unduly harsh and
inconsistent with precedent. Second, as other scholars have noted, the
narrow rule inappropriately applies the tangible employment action
requirement created by the Supreme Court in Ellerth/Faragher. As a
result, the adverse employment action prong of McDonnell Douglas
becomes outcome-determinative against the employee. Third, the
Supreme Court’s decision in Suders is likely to muddy the waters
even further, because it builds on the tangible employment action
standard set forth in Ellerth/Faragher. Although some of the language
in Suders could be interpreted to lend credence to the universal
adoption of a narrower rule, the Court’s holding actually supports the
broad rule.
1. Inappropriate Addition of a “But For” Requirement in the
Prima Facie Case. When applied in reference cases, the narrow rule
requires that employees meet an additional “but for” causation
element to make the prima facie case. The inquiry as to whether a
negative reference constitutes an adverse employment action under
the narrow rule focuses improperly on causation rather than on the
harm or potential harm to the employee. In a case applying the
narrow rule, for example, the Second Circuit stated: “[w]here . . .
there is no admissible evidence that the statements of the former
employer caused or contributed to the rejection by the prospective
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employer, the employee has failed to present a prima facie case.”77
Although not worded as such, the result of this test is that Hillig
would not have been able to prove the prima facie case as she could
not show she would have gotten the job but for the negative
reference. Employees have significantly less information about the
hiring process than do employers, and given the subjective nature of
the hiring process, it is difficult to state that any one factor would be
determinative in a decision not to hire a particular applicant. Thus,
the narrow rule incorporates an additional “but for” test into the
adverse employment action element of the prima facie case, which
creates a nearly impossible standard for an employee to meet.78
There is, of course, a causation element to the prima facie case
that must be met by all employees. Although the specifics vary by
jurisdiction, the general rules on the causation requirement are that it
can be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence, there must be a
proximate link between the protected activity and the alleged
retaliation, and the person taking the adverse employment action
must have known about the protected activity.79 The causation
requirement can be difficult to meet,80 but even narrow -rule courts
have acknowledged that requiring a “but for” test under the prima
facie case is inappropriate. In Long v. Eastfield College,81 for example,
the Fifth Circuit stated: “we do note that a employee need not prove
that her protected activity was the sole factor motivating the
employer’s challenged decision in order to establish . . . a prima facie
case.”82 The court’s analysis in Long was focused on the causation
aspect of the prima facie case,83 rather than on causation as an aspect
77. Sarno, 183 F.3d at 160. In Bailey, the employee received an unfavorable reference and
was rejected for the prospective position: the court approved the district court’s findings that the
employer “would not have hired Bailey even if the negative reference had not been given.” 850
F.2d at 1508.
78. See Hillig v. Rumsfeld, 381 F.3d 1028, 1030–31 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding that employee
could not prove that she would have gotten the job but for the negative reference).
79. Cude & Steger, supra note 30, at 379–80. There is some disagreement as to how
proximate the adverse action must be to the protected activity, given that the Third Circuit has
held that “temporal proximity” is often sufficient to prove causation whereas the Eighth Circuit
has held that temporal proximity is inadequate. Id. at 380 n.37 (citing Feltmann v. Sieben, 108
F.3d 970, 977 (8th Cir. 1997) and Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 920 (3d Cir. 1997)).
80. See supra Part I.B.
81. 88 F.3d 300 (5th Cir. 1996).
82. Id. at 305 n.4.
83. See id. (finding that “[t]he standard for establishing the ‘causal link’ element of the
employee’s prima facie case is much less stringent” than the “but for” requirement incorporated
later in the test).
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of the adverse employment action requirement, and it is logical that
the latter element should not contain a stricter causation requirement
than does the causation element itself.
If the employee reaches a jury, however, some courts, including
the Fifth Circuit, the leading proponent of the narrow rule, do
incorporate a “but for” test into the McDonnell Douglas framework.
After the employer provides a legitimate purpose for the adverse
employment action, the Fifth Circuit requires the employee show that
but for the discriminatory purpose, the adverse employment action
would not have been taken.84 Even the Fifth Circuit, however, agrees
that the causation standard for the prima facie case is much lighter
than the standard imposed on the employee to win before a jury,
which is indeed a “but for” standard.85 “At this threshold stage, the
standard for satisfying the causation element is ‘much less stringent’
than a ‘but for’ causation standard.”86
Why does it matter that the narrow rule implements a “but for”
causation requirement for the adverse-employment-action prong of
the prima facie case if employees will be forced to meet this burden
eventually? The prima facie case exists to promote information
sharing and solve the “problem of proof” that exists for employees
trying to prove the intangibles of discrimination or retaliation.87 The
“problem of proof” refers to the difficulty that employees have
establishing or finding proof of discriminatory intent: providing
compelling evidence of the mental state and intentions of another is a
very difficult task. When an employee meets the lighter burden called
for under the prima facie case, the employer—the party with the
information about the intentions behind the adverse employment
action—has an incentive to produce information about those
intentions to show that the action was not done in retaliation. The
prima facie case also exists as a screening mechanism to ensure that
those cases devoid of merit do not take up time in the legal system or
create undue expense for the employer.88 Employees who are able to
establish a prima facie case are entitled to judgment in their favor
84. Pineda v. UPS, 360 F.3d 483, 487 (5th Cir. 2004).
85. Fierros v. Tex. Dep’t of Health, 274 F.3d 187, 191–92 (5th Cir. 2001).
86. Id. at 191 (quoting Long v. Eastfield College, 88 F.3d 300, 305 n.4 (5th Cir. 1996)).
87. Mark S. Brodin, The Demise of Circumstantial Proof in Employment Discrimination
Litigation: St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, Pretext, and the “Persona lity” Excuse, 18
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 183, 187–92 (1997).
88. See id. at 191 (“A case is highly unlikely to get to trial if the complainant cannot make
the minimal showing necessary to raise an inference of discrimination . . . .”).
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unless the employer offers some legitimate reason for the adverse
employment action.89 Once past the prima facie case stage, the
employee is also more likely to receive a settlement offer or to be
able to engage in more extensive discovery to get the proof required
to actually win before a jury.
2. The Inappropriate Application of the Tangible Employment
Action Standard. The narrow rule also inappropriately follows the
tangible employment action standard set out by the Supreme Court
for discrimination cases in Ellerth/Faragher.90 Professor Rosalie
Berger Levinson reaches this conclusion in her analysis of adverse
employment actions in the larger context of Title VII retaliation,
disparate treatment, and sexual harassment claims.91 Although
Professor Levinson does not examine the specific issue of references
in retaliation claims, she argues that applying the tangible
employment action standard to retaliation claims is generally
inappropriate.92 Perhaps most persuasive is her argument that
applying discrimination law to retaliation claims is inappropriate
because Congress intended to create a broader standard for
retaliation than for discrimination.93 Offering further support for this
position is the Supreme Court’s opinion in Robinson v. Shell Oil. 94 In
Shell Oil, the Court interpreted Title VII’s use of the term
“employee” to include former employees and found “a primary
purpose of antiretaliation provisions” is to promote “unfettered
access to statutory remedial mechanisms.”95 Of Shell Oil, Professor
Levinson writes that “[t]he Supreme Court . . . acknowledged the
89. See id. at 189 (“If the employer fails to articulate . . . a reason, the court must enter
judgment for the employee.”).
90. See supra Part I.C for a discussion of Ellerth/Faragher and the tangible employment
action standard.
91. Levinson, supra note 49, at 674. Professor Levinson’s analysis offers an excellent and
detailed analysis of the standard for actionable wrongdoing under Title VII.
92. See id. at 648–52 (criticizing the application of discrimination law to retaliation claims).
For another discussion of the inappropriateness of applying the Ellerth/Faragher standard to
retaliation claims and the benefits of the “liberal standard,” see Eddy, supra note 54, at 361.
93. Levinson, supra note 49, at 651–52. A less persuasive argument attempts to analogize
Title VII retaliation claims to First Amendment retaliation cases, which have received broad
treatment by the Supreme Court. Id. at 653–54. As First Amendment rights are constitutionally
guaranteed and have a long history of protection, it seems illogical to compare the First
Amendment decisions to retaliation, which is a statutory protection not traditionally granted the
same deference.
94. 519 U.S. 337 (1997).
95. Id. at 346.
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need for a broad interpretation of Title VII’s retaliation provision
because those who engage in EEOC activity must be confident that
the Act will protect them.”96 Just as denying a former employee
protection under the retaliation statute would go against the goal of
unfettered access to remedial mechanisms, requiring the employee to
meet such a difficult test at the prima facie case stage would work
against this goal by unduly burdening the employee’s access to the
appropriate remedial mechanism.
Professor Margery Corbin Eddy has analyzed the application of
the Ellerth/Faragher liability standard to retaliation claims and also
found the narrow rule’s application of this standard to retaliation
claims inappropriate.97 Professor Eddy argues that the application of
the “ultimate employment action” standard, derived from the
application of Ellerth/Faragher to retaliation claims under the narrow
rule, will become outcome -determinative in a way that is harmful to
both employers and employees.98 Given that the Ellerth/Faragher
standard calls for strict liability in discrimination cases if the
employee shows a tangible employment action,99 the direct
application of this standard in retaliation cases would create strict
liability for the employer if the employee showed a tangible
employment action as part of the prima facie case.100 As unbalanced
as this strict liability in retaliation cases would be for employers, so
too would the converse of this application be for employees: in the
absence of a tangible employment action, the employee would always
lose.101 Therefore, when the tangible employment action requirement
is applied to retaliation cases, the standard for recovery becomes even
narrower than that in discrimination cases, not broader as Congress

96. Levinson, supra note 49, at 652. It is also worth noting that the majority of the circuits
and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) support the use of the broad
rule in defining adverse actions. Id. Professor Levinson highlights the EEOC’s interpretation
that retaliation should focus on the deterrent effect that an employer’s conduct would have on
protected activity rather than on the conduct’s effect on the employee’s employment status. Id.
at 659.
97. See Eddy, supra note 54, at 377–79 (arguing that the liberal, or broad, definition is more
desirable).
98. Id. at 378.
99. See supra Part I.C.
100. Eddy, supra note 54, at 378.
101. See Eddy, supra note 54, at 378 (noting that under the tangible employment action
standard, “many claims recognized as viable by the Supreme Court in Burlington
Industries/Faragher would never reach a trier of fact”).
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intended.102 Although the dearth of Supreme Court guidance in
retaliation cases naturally encourages courts to look to its
discrimination cases, the resulting test under the narrow rule creates a
standard that is both illogical and overly strict for employees when
viewed in light of statutory intent.
3. The Likely Impact of Suders on the Debate. Next, although
scholars have identified the incorrect application of the tangible
employment action standard as a major problem with the narrow
rule,103 their analyses preceded the Supreme Court’s decision in
Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders.104 At first glance, Suders might
seem to support a narrow-rule construction because the Court held
that an employee must show that a constructive discharge is
effectuated by an “official act” of the company in order to constitute
a tangible employment action in a retaliation case.105 As explained in
the previous section, however, applying the Ellerth/Faragher
discrimination standard, as clarified in Suders, to retaliation cases
would be inappropriate. Interpreted in the appropriate context,
Suders actually offers support for the broad rule: it emphasizes that
although employees in discrimination cases who cannot show that
they suffered a tangible employment action would have to overcome
the employer’s affirmative defense, they would still be able to make a
case.106 Therefore, an employee unable to establish a tangible
employment action could still make out a prima facie case of
discrimination. It would be inconsistent with Court precedent and
Congressional intent to give narrower interpretation to the retaliation
provision than the discrimination provision, allowing discrimination
employees, but not employees alleging retaliation, to proceed without
showing tangible employment action.107

102. Levinson, supra note 49, at 651–52.
103. Id.
104. 124 S. Ct. 2342 (2004); see supra Part I.C for a detailed discussion of the case.
105. See id. at 2355 (“[W]hen an official act does not underlie the constructive discharge, the
Ellerth and Faragher analysis, we here hold, calls for extension of the affirmative defense to the
employer.”).
106. See id. at 2351 (concluding that an employer can raise an affirmative defense to a
employee’s prima facie case if the employee does not show a tangible employment action).
107. Levinson, supra note 49, at 651–52.
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B. Policy Arguments
The policy arguments in favor of the broad rule are also
powerful. The Supreme Court should find that the broad rule is
preferable, especially in the reference context, for three reasons.
First, the distribution of power between employers and employees is
inherently unequal; second, as the EEOC has emphasized, Title VII’s
protections will be meaningless without an effective retaliation statute
to protect employees; and third, employers will only be deterred from
retaliating against employees for participating in protected activity if
employees have the power to bring retaliation claims against them.
1. Addressing the Imbalance of Power between Employers and
Employees. The broad rule is the only way to redress the inherently
unequal access to information and power that exists in the employeremployee relationship. A reference, like any other employment
action taken by an employer, is unilateral: the employee cannot
control what is happening.108 In Hillig, the employee could not change
or control what her supervisor said about her,109 and there are other
cases in which a negative reference is given and the employee is never
aware of it.110 Because employees are unlikely to have much
information about either the negative references or how potential
employers will react to them, it is disadvantageous, from a policy
standpoint, to require employees to prove they would have gotten the
prospective job but for the negative reference. Employers, in contrast,
have ready access to this information, and therefore they should be
required to produce it at the second stage of the McDonnell Douglas
framework.111

108. Although, for example, an employee can “control” whether she is terminated by trying
to be a good worker, ultimately the employer may choose to fire her whether or not she works
hard. This is not meant to be an argument that employees should have a different role in the
employment relationship or that the “at will” doctrine should be abolished. Rather, this Note
argues that there is an inherent power disparity and that the law must respond to this in order to
be effective.
109. See Hillig v. Rumsfeld, 381 F.3d 1028, 1030 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding that the supervisor
made a variety of negative comments about Hillig’s work performance).
110. See Randy Cohen, The Way We Live Now, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2002, at 28 (discussing
whether one friend should inform another that the latter had received a negative employer
reference).
111. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (“The burden then
must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
employee’s rejection.”).
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Moreover, the prima facie case is intended to be a fairly low
bar;112 applying the broad rule maintains the integrity of this bar and
does not create an inappropriately high hurdle for employees. As this
Note argued in Part II, the extra “but for” causation requirement
imposed by the narrow rule makes it nearly impossible for an
employee to make out a prima facie case when a negative reference is
in question. Even employees like Hillig, with a compelling story and
clearly egregious conduct by her supervisor, would be unable to
establish the prima facie case.113 The broad rule is necessary both
because the information gap between employers and employees is
wide and because it will allow employees to survive the prima facie
case, thereby forcing employers to provide otherwise undiscoverable
information to the court. Thus, at each stage of litigation, the broad
rule puts the burden of production upon the party most able to satisfy
it.
2. Maintaining an Effective Retaliation Statute. Given that many
otherwise actionable claims would be rejected under the narrow
rule,114 the broad rule is necessary to ensure that employees are
protected by an effective retaliation provision and are not dissuaded
from bringing Title VII claims. The Supreme Court’s opinion in Shell
Oil indicates that the Court recognizes the importance of retaliation
provisions and the need to interpret them broadly.115 The EEOC has
also argued for the adoption of the broad rule, and Shell Oil states
that the EEOC’s arguments “carry persuasive force given their
coherence and their consistency with a primary purpose of
antiretaliation provisions: Maintaining unfettered access to statutory
remedial mechanisms.”116 Although Shell Oil concerned the EEOC’s
position on the interpretation of the statutory term “employee,” the

112. See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (explaining that
the burden for the prima facie case should not be overly high).
113. See Hillig, 381 F.3d at 1030 (describing the extremely negative feedback given by
Hillig’s supervisor to her prospective employer after she had made Title VII discrimination
claims against the supervisor).
114. See Eddy, supra note 54, at 378 (noting that the narrow rule would preclude many
viable claims from ever reaching a trier of fact).
115. Robinson v. Shell Oil, 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997).
116. Id.
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agency makes the same policy arguments in favor of the broad rule
when defining adverse employment actions.117
Because employees are unlikely to be able to prove that they
were not hired because of a negative reference, the possibility of a
negative reference in retaliation is particularly damaging and very
likely to chill employee involvement in protected activity. If
employees thought that an employer could retaliate against them
after engaging in protected activities and go beyond the current (and
presumably already unhappy) employment relationship to damage a
future one, they would be much less likely to participate in such
activities.118
3. Deterring Employer Retaliation. The broad rule will deter
illegal employer retaliation because employees will be more likely to
be successful in establishing a prima facie case. The New York Times
published a letter from an individual who knew (although the
colleague did not know) that a colleague had received a negative
reference.119 Because so many people are unaware of negative
references that have been given about them, it is especially important
for those individuals with knowledge of a negative reference to have a
fair chance at making a successful prima facie case in order to deter
employers from retaliating against employees by giving negative
references.120 As difficult as it is to police the often hidden inner
workings and politics of a workplace, a strong deterrent is one of the
only ways to prevent employers from giving negative references
motivated by retaliation.
The Supreme Court and the EEOC have both expressed the
concern that employers will retaliate against employees for exercising
their rights under Title VII if there is not a sufficient legal protection
against such retaliation. The Supreme Court acknowledged, in Shell
Oil, the danger of allowing employers to retaliate against employees

117. See id. at 344–47 (citing the EEOC guidelines that call for a broad interpretation of
Title VII).
118. Employers are likely to argue that many of these claims are frivolous and that there
needs to be increased scrutiny of these claims, not increased access. Although this is certainly a
valid argument, it contradicts the legal precedent and the EEOC guidelines for the
interpretation of the statute. As explained in Part IV, infra, the overall test remains strict
enough to weed out frivolous claims; the broad rule simply allows employees a narrow window
to potentially make a valid claim.
119. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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who engage in protected activity. There the Supreme Court cited the
EEOC Compliance manual with approval, agreeing that an
antiretaliation provision must be effective to prevent discrimination
against employees who invoke protections under Title VII.121
Applying the broad rule will not only take away the “perverse
incentives” feared by the Supreme Court,122 it will deter more
indefinite adverse actions, like references, that are by their very
nature harder for employees to take action on later.
Scholars have also identified the need for a broad rule to deter
employer retaliation. One article points out that the narrow rule
“practically encourages employers to retaliate against protected
employees in numerous intangible manners which, in their totality,
may in fact be as tangible, if not more so, than any ultimate
employment decision.”123 Another scholar suggests that applying the
narrow rule would allow employers to subtly punish employees in
such ways as moving them to another department without cause
without fear of violating antiretaliation statutes.124 Making employers
consistently liable for giving a retaliatory negative reference will serve
to deter bad actors and make all employers more thoughtful about
the reference-giving process.
* * *
Legally, the narrow rule fails as it incorporates a “but for”
requirement into the prima facie case and inappropriately applies
Supreme Court precedent. These failings are only likely to be
magnified if courts use Suders to further interpret these cases. The
broad rule supports the important policy goals of deterring employers
from retaliating against employees, upholding the protections of Title
VII, and adjusting the imbalance of access to information and power
that exists between employers and employees.
IV. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF APPLYING THE BROAD RULE:
ACHIEVING A BALANCED OUTCOME
When combined with the entire McDonnell Douglas framework,
the employee-favorable broad rule results in a fair framework that

121. Shell Oil, 519 U.S. at 346.
122. See Essary & Friedman, supra note 21, at 152 (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil, 519 U.S.
337, 346 (1997)).
123. Id.
124. Wiles, supra note 16, at 234–35.
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balances as best as possible the competing interests of employers and
employees. Although Part III argued that the broad rule is preferable
from both a legal and a policy perspective, the broad rule may
increase employer anxiety because of its case-by-case approach and
“fuzzy” nature.125 Employers’ anxiety over potential liability already
makes them reluctant to provide references; although many states
have protective legislation shielding employers from defamation suits
resulting from references,126 some scholars have suggested that
protective legislation has done little to assuage employer concerns.127
An equally powerful argument against the broad rule is that
employers typically seek early resolution of litigation, either via
summary judgment or by settling a case with the employee, and the
broad rule makes this resolution less likely.128 Efficiency is a worthy
goal when paired with respect for an employee’s rights, and there is a
loss in rejecting the narrow rule, which provides a more bright-line
resolution.129
The broad rule does deny the possibility of such tidy resolution,
but when viewed within the entirety of the McDonnell Douglas
framework, the broad rule actually balances out the system of
burdens under which it has become increasingly difficult for
employees to triumph. It is possible that an employee will be able to
present a prima facie case of retaliation against an employer who had
perfectly legitimate motives for providing a negative reference, but
the framework then allows that employer to prove that le gitimate

125. See Hyland, supra note 21, at 292 (arguing that the broad rule opens employers to
unnecessary liability).
126. For a state-by-state review of job-reference shield laws, see William C. Martucci &
Kevin Mason, State Regulations Update, EMPLOYER R EL. TODAY, Summer 2002, at 75.
127. See Harshman & Chachere, supra note 7, at 37 (expressing the belief that the statutes
do not bolster employer confidence and encourage references). Professor Saxman has suggested
a fee-shifting arrangement to discourage employees from bringing frivolous claims and to
reduce employer anxiety about the cost of litigation. Id. (citing B. Saxman, Flaws in the Laws
Governing Employment References: Problems of “Overdeterrence” and a Proposal for Reform,
13 YALE L. & POL’Y R EV. 45, 98–107 (1995)).
128. See John Parauda & Jathan Janove, Settle for Less: Consider the Merits of an Early
Settlement Approach to Employment Litigation, HR MAGAZINE, Nov. 2004, at 135, 136–40
(analyzing approaches to modern employment litigation and describing employer preference to
settle cases).
129. See Cude & Steger, supra note 30, at 374 (arguing that the Fifth Circuit’s narrow rule is
advantageous because it provides a bright-line rule).
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motive.130 Even scholars favoring the narrow rule admit that the
second stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework favors employers:
“Since [the employer’s] burden [is] of production only, courts
generally accept any nondiscriminatory reason proffered by
employers.”131 The employee still has the opportunity to present
evidence that the reason was pretextual; to prevail, however, the
employee must prove both that the employer’s proffered reason is
false and that the real reason for the employer’s action was
discriminatory—a very high burden that is not often satisfied.132 As
explained in Part I, the burdens of the prima facie case differ
significantly from the employee’s ultimate burden of proof of
causation.
Finally, any discussion of the McDonnell Douglas framework
must take into consideration the Court’s decision of St. Mary’s Honor
Center v. Hicks133 and the subsequent scholarly uproar over its
erosion of McDonnell Douglas.134 Professor Deborah Malamud calls
for abandonment of the framework, arguing that, after Hicks, it offers
little help to employees who lack direct evidence of discrimination. 135
Other scholars claim that the framework still retains value.136
Regardless of what some scholars suggest, however, the McDonnell
Douglas framework has not been jettisoned by the Supreme Court,
and until it is, federal courts will continue to use it to analyze
retaliation cases.
Especially considering how difficult it is for employees to prove
discrimination after Hicks, the broad rule does not create an overly
employee-friendly test.137 Even if the broad rule makes it more
difficult for employers to obtain summary judgment at the prima facie
130. See Shea, supra note 10, at 89 (“Dealing with an employee who has engaged in
protected activity and also has attitude or performance problems can be one of the biggest
challenges facing even experienced, seasoned HR professionals.”).
131. Cude & Steger, supra note 30, at 380.
132. See St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506–11 (1993) (explaining that a
employee must also prove that discrimination was the reason behind the employer’s action and
that showing the reason was pretextual is not enough to win before a jury).
133. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
134. See Malamud, supra note 35, at 2236–37 (arguing that McDonnell Douglas has been so
altered that employees would fare better under the traditional preponde rance-of-the -evidence
standard).
135. Id.
136. See Brodin, supra note 87, at 229–39 (criticizing the move away from allowing
circumstantial evidence and the distortion of McDonnell Douglas).
137. Id.
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case stage, the overall test still remains remarkably employer friendly.
False claims of retaliation supported by flimsy evidence will not
survive the prima facie case stage when the broad rule is applied, and
those employees who are unable to prove before a jury that
retaliatory intent ultimately motivated the negative reference will not
prevail. The broad rule offers employees a small opportunity to have
their cases heard by a jury, whereas the narrow rule offers almost no
opportunity. If employers are desperate to avoid a jury trial and are
unable to get summary judgment at the prima facie case stage, they
can settle the case with willing employees, thereby hopefully making
more damaged employees whole.
CONCLUSION
Although the idea of applying a standard that has been labeled
“broad” strikes fear into the hearts of many employers, the reality is
that courts applying the broad rule “have done so cautiously.”138 The
Third Circuit perhaps articulated the spirit of the broad rule best in
stating that “[a]n employer who retaliates can not [sic] escape liability
merely because the retaliation falls short of its intended result.”139
Both policy and legal arguments support the universal adoption of the
broad rule. Although the advantages of the narrow, bright-line rule
are clear, the end result is unacceptable if Title VII is to remain a
meaningful protection for employees. Even those employees, like
Terrie Hillig, who were inappropriately retaliated against would be
unable to make valid retaliation claims if the narrow rule were
adopted. Ultimately, when the broad rule is situated within the
potentially weakened McDonnell Douglas framework, the resulting
test is as fair and reasonable as can be imagined within the strictures
of the current law.

138. Eddy, supra note 54, at 377; see, e.g., Annett v. Univ. of Kan., 371 F.3d 1233, 1238–39
(10th Cir. 2004) (applying the broad rule and finding that the employee’s failure to achieve
Principal Investigator status was not an adverse action).
139. EEOC v. L.B. Foster Co., 123 F.3d 746, 754 (3d Cir. 1997).

